Introduction
China's outward direct investment (ODI) has become a worldwide phenomenon in recent years, having increased from $2.85 billion in 2003 to $74.65 billion in 2011 in flow terms, and jumped from $29.9 billion to $424.8 billion in stock terms during the same period. China, following the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, France and Hong Kong, was in 2011 the sixth-largest ODI investor in the world, and the largest in developing countries.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are currently the major players in Chinese ODI, albeit their relative importance is declining (Wang and Huang 2012a) . Wholly state-owned unincorporated enterprises devoured 66 per cent of total investments in 2010. Meanwhile, SOEs under central government contributed nearly 80 per cent of Chinese total overseas investments.
Should private enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) pursue ODI? Such a question obviously should be left to the investors themselves. But international experience and existing literature seems to argue that even those primarily domestically oriented SMEs must operate internationally in order to improve their competitiveness and maintain viability (Etemad 1999 (Etemad , 2004 . There is also evidence that entry into foreign markets, regardless of how this happens, could significantly promote, improve and increase the development, performance and profitabilty of firms, thus contributing to domestic wealth (Daniels and Bracker 1989) . Besides, ODI compared with exports is found to generate the highest profit level and maximise control of critical knowledge (Lu and Beamish 2001; Tang and Yu 1990) .
Then, why is it that SOEs currently dominate Chinese ODI? It has been proposed that this is the result of the growth of a Chinese-style ODI (Huang and Wang 2011) , which forms part of an evolutionary path from Chinese-style ODI, to Japanese-style ODI and finally US-style ODI (Wang and Huang 2012b) . That SOEs dominate current Chinese ODI partly reflects the focus of Chinese ODI being to strengthen domestic production, rather than moving factories overseas, to improve the competitiveness of investing firms, rather than exploit existing, firm-specific advantages. But domestic financial repression also makes the dominance of SOEs possible. The direct result is that private sector SMEs, especially, face severe financial constraints. The direct, firm-level evidence on the effect of financial constraints on ODI has, however, been limited. The application to China is almost zero.
This chapter fills this void by providing a detailed analysis of the role that financial constraint plays in restricting firms' ODI activity. Using detailed, firmlevel data of Zhejiang Province between 2006 and 2008, three main findings become clear: first, firms with less financial constraint (more liquidity, or with foreign ownership) are more likely to enter the foreign market, pursuing ODI; second, higher productivity can mitigate some of the negative impact of financial constraints for exporters, but can not compensate for the financial constraint that is faced by ODI firms.
This evidence indicates that financial constraint hinders Chinese private enterprises pursuing ODI, and their higher productivity does not mitigate that negative impact. These results are verified by sensitivity analysis. Other variables that might affect ODI activities are controlled, including firm productivity, size, age, profitability, capital intensity, firm export experience, cyclical effects and industry-specific effects. The empirical approach adopted here addresses some concerns about reverse causality by using lagged variables, and reducing observations to ODI for the first time.
The chapter implies that if financial constraint is still in existence, those more viable, more productive and more competitive private enterprises are likely to be shut out of opportunities for ODI. As a result, the quality and return of Chinese ODI, and the image and reputation of overseas Chinese enterprises, will become a concern. Section 2 of this chapter reviews existing literature on firm heterogeneity and internationalised activities. Section 3 is a data description, which is followed by variable construction. Section 4 employs a multinomial logit model to assess the impact of financial constraint on a firm's decision to become the domestic, exporter, or ODI player. Section 5 presents the impact of financial constraint on the amount of ODI made; and, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Firms generally have three channels to serve foreign customers: through export, through foreign subsidiaries, or through licensed foreign partners. Comprehensive considerations influence a firm's choice of using a single or mixed channels. S. Lael Brainard (1997) offers a characterisation of, and empirical support for, the proximity-concentration trade-off in the face of a firm's ODI/ export decision. That is, firms invest abroad rather than export when the gains from proximity to local market outweigh the cost advantages to concentration (economies of scale).
Firms are heterogeneous; even facing the same industry costs and the same investment opportunity, they may still make different choices about market entry. Paul Krugman (1980) produced one of the early studies incorporating firm heterogeneity into a trade model. As an extension, Marc Melitz (2003) develops a dynamic industry model based on heterogeneous firms and shows that exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market, some less productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market, and the least productive firms will be forced to exit the market.
Stephen Yeaple (2005) shows similar findings based on a general equilibrium trade model in which homogeneous firms choose competing technologies and workers of heterogeneous skill.
With the growth of multinational sales outpacing trade expansion, literature increasingly focuses the impact of firm heterogeneity on the choice between exports and ODI. The most important one is Elhanan Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (henceforth HMY) . HMY develop a simple, multicountry model based on multiple sectors of monopolistically competitive firms. The heterogeneity of firms arises from productivity differences. They find that cross-sectoral differences in firm heterogeneity predict the composition of trade and investment: the least productive firms serve only the domestic market, the relatively more productive firms export, and the most productive firms engage in ODI. They also prove the argument by using US exports and affiliate sales data that cover 52 manufacturing sectors and 38 countries.
Several other studies try to test HMY's argument. Going beyond tests for differences in mean productivity, that are typically found in the literature, Sourafel Girma, Richard Kneller and Mauro Pisu (2005) apply KolmogrovSmirnov stochastic dominance to UK-owned multinational corporations. Their finding is quite consistent with HMY's: the productivity distribution of multinational firms dominates that of export firms, which in turn dominates that of non-exporters. HMY's model assumes that all ODI is horizontally motivated and happening among economies with similar factor price and market size. Keith Head and John Ries (2003) extend the model to vertical ODI by introducing heterogeneous labour costs in different countries, which involve fragmentation of production across countries. They show the productivity ordering predicted by HMY can be reversed if the foreign country is the low-cost production site. That is, the low productivity firms may also engage in ODI in low-cost foreign countries, and more productive firms may stay at home and supply foreign markets through exports. But, as David Greenaway and Kneller (2007) point out, since the data sample in Head and Ries (2003) only consists of 1070 large, publicly listed Japanese firms, their result could be an exception to the general pattern.
Productivity is not, however, the sole determinant of firms' internationalisation behaviours. Many productive firms only serve the domestic market, while many less productive firms engage in export or ODI (Bernard et al. 2003; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007) . Figure 16 .1 displays the distribution of the log of productivity (approximate total factor productivity and Labour productivity) for Chinese ODI firms and Non_ODI firms. As shown, firms engaging in ODI are generally more productive than those that do not. Nevertheless, the two distributions overlap. That is, many productive firms do not invest abroad. Conversely, many unproductive firms make ODI decisions. Analysts have found similar patterns in the United States, Belgium and Japan (Bernard et al. 2003; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007; and, Todo 2011) .
Credit constraints influence whether the firm can finance the initial costs of export and ODI. Using cross-country data, Kalina Manova (2008) finds that equity market liberalisation increases exports more in credit-constrained sectors than in other sectors. There is also growing micro-evidence that credit market imperfections severely restrict the export capacity of firms. Using detailed customs data from China, Manova, Wei Shang-Jin and Zhang Zhiwei (2011) have identified the negative impact of credit constraints on export performance. More specifically, they find that financial frictions limit exporters' product scope, number of trade partners, and volume of cross-border flows within each product-destination market. Robert Feenstra, Li Zhiyuan and Yu Miaojie (2011) developed a theoretical setting where banks do not observe firms' productivities, and induced a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters' home market. Their empirical application to Chinese firms strongly supports the theoretical results, and they find a sizable impact of the financial crisis in reducing exports. Similar results are reported in Mirabelle Muuls (2008) , Nicolas Berman and Jérôme Héricourt (2008) and Raoul Minetti and Susan Chun Zhu (2010) . To address the endogeneity of financial constraints to firms' international trade decisions, Mary Amiti and David Weinstein (2009) have employed exogenous shocks to firms' access to external finance, and found that Japanese banks transmitted financial shocks to exporters during the crises in the 1990s. In addition to export decisions, Yasuyuki Todo (2011) also finds credit constraints have a negative effect on firms' ODI decisions.
Credit constraints are particularly severe in SMEs and have a greater impact on their investment behaviours (Berger and Udell 1998; Hall 1992) . Compared with large enterprises, SMEs usually have higher failure rates, more pronounced problems of agency and asymmetric information (Bruderl et al. 1992) . As a result, some policy schemes, like direct loans, interest subsidies and loan guarantees, have been set up to alleviate the credit constraint of SMEs (Cressy 1996 (Cressy , 2002 . Nevertheless, there has been limited study in the existing literature that explores the financial constraints SMEs face when pursuing ODI, although quite a number of studies have found that SMEs frequently face a shortage of capital to finance their exports (Bilkey & Tesar 1977; Crick 2004; Hook & Czinkota 1988) . A survey by the European Commission suggested that SMEs, engaging in ODI, might confront a shortage of capital (European Commission 2003a). Wouter de Maeseneire and Tine Claeys (2012) found the home bias of financiers, and the capital gearing method used by banks to evaluate small firms' foreign projects, give rise to financial constraints for Belgian SMEs' ODI projects.
The majority of studies on firms' heterogeneity and decisions with regard to internationalisation are based on experiences in developed countries and/ or are limited to analysis of export behaviour (for example, Bernard et al. 2003; Greenaway & Kneller 2004; Girma, Kneller & Pisu 2005) . The inclusion of ODI into reviews of internationalisation decision-making starts with HMY (2004), but mostly are still drawn from high income economies, such as the United States (Helpman et al. 2004) , and Japan (Head & Ries 2003; Tomiura 2007; Todo 2011 ).
This line of research following developing economies' experience is limited. One exception uses Slovenian manufacturing data, and finds roughly a 20 per cent average productivity advantage of exporting and ODI firms over those that serve only domestic markets (Damijan et al. 2007 ). But, according to the same study, in Slovenia, due to transition-specific features related to inherited foreign investments of large inefficient firms, there is no statistically significant productivity advantage of ODI firms over exporting firms.
Another exception is Tian and Yu (2011). To our knowledge, theirs is the only firm-level empirical investigation on the relationship between Chinese manufacturing firms' productivity and their ODI decision-making. They find firms with high total factor productivity (TFP) are more likely to engage in ODI, and the higher TFP the firm has, the more the ODI is. But Tian and Yu (2012) do not explore why firms with similar TFP will make different decisions with regard to ODI. This chapter makes two distinct contributions to the literature. First, this study applies to Chinese ODI with firm level information. The research on Chinese ODI lags behind China's influential role in global ODI scene. MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce, China) data is currently the most widely used official data, but analysis based on such data should be accepted with caution because it is aggregate data, and information is missed during the process of aggregation. This study uncovers a real picture of Chinese manufacturing firms' ODI with a valid, representative, authoritative and comprehensive micro foundation. Secondly, this study provides evidence on the effects of financial constraints on private SMEs' ODI. This study not only describes the productivity characteristics of firms that only serve domestic markets, and firms entering foreign markets through export and/or through ODI. It also goes a step further in uncovering the impact of financial constraints, in particular, on private enterprises and SMEs, and on firms' internationalisation behaviour. These factors reflect the institutional features in transitional economies, such as a repressive financial system and a controlled capital account. This study provides micro-evidence of the urgency in deepening domestic reform and restructure. It also provides reference to other emerging and developing economies.
Data and Measures

The Dataset
To uncover true pattern of Chinese ODI in manufacturing, this study is based on a comprehensive and authoritative firm-level data from 2006 to 2008 in Zhejiang Province. ODI from Zhejiang Province is also widely representative of the behaviour of China's private investing firms. Of these investors, 70 per cent are from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. The decisions of private firms are reflected in market forces, and they are less influenced by political and administrative elements. Thus, it is useful to compare this evidence with international experience and the existing literature.
Firm-level ODI data is merged with firm-level production data, which is compiled by China's National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises. Table 16 .1 reveals the ODI pattern and, thereupon, three aspects are evident.
First, the majority of ODI investors went to developed economies, but there is larger-scale investment in developing countries. The economy that attracts most Chinese firms is the United States, followed by Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Germany and Vietnam; four of these five are high-income economies. In fact, 66.82 per cent of Chinese ODI investors concentrated their efforts on developed economies. Investment scale in developed economies is not, however, as large as in developing countries. Of this, 33.18 per cent of investors occupied 58.44 per cent of the investment in developing countries. Vietnam has the largest share of this investment, while Cambodia is also an important host country.
Second, most of Chinese ODI institutions are in the form of trading or trade-related companies, and very few enterprises set up their production facilities abroad. Of Chinese firms, 82.89 per cent conducted ODI either through establishing economic and trade offices, or by establishing a trading company. Only 9.23 per cent of Chinese ODI firms were involved in production activity, while 5.51 per cent produced for the processing trade. Nevertheless, because of the higher cost of setting up production facilities, in comparison with establishing trading offices, 63.93 per cent of Chinese ODI was used for funding production.
Third, among the top five Chinese ODI industries, the largest group of investors was from the machinery manufacturing industry, but investment in textiles accounted for a larger share in ODI value. As shown in Table 16 .1, 16.82 per cent of investors were from the textile industry and they contributed to 40.49 per cent of the investment amount. Meanwhile, investors from machinery manufacturing industries were also important ODI players, but their investment scale was smaller.
Variable Definition
To measure the severity of financial constraints, the literature in corporate finance has suggested several possibilities, including investment-cash flow sensitivities (Fazzari et al. 1988) , the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index of constraints (Lamont et al. 2001) , the Whited and Wu (WW) index of constraints (Whited and Wu 2006) , the size-age (SA) index of constraints (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), and various sorting criteria based on firm characteristics. There is considerable debate with regard to the relative merits of each approach. But the variables consistently predict that a firm's financial constraint status, after controlling for size and age, are a firm's leverage and cash flow (Hadlock and Pierce 2010). That is, larger, older firms with lower leverage and more cash flow usually face less financial constraints. But, because of the endogenous nature of this variable, it is necessary to use caution when assessing leverage as an indicator for financial constraint. Therefore, after controlling the size and age of the firm, we consider two measures of firm-level financial constraint. The first is liquidity, defined as the share of current assets in total assets. Given other factors, the lower liquidity, the larger the financial constraint. The second measure is the dummy variable for foreign invested enterprises (FIE). Various researches have found that FIE are less financially constrained since they have additional funding sources from their parent company. For instance, research has found that the affiliates of US multinational corporations use less external financing in countries with underdeveloped financial markets, but have greater borrowing from the parent company so as to overcome imperfections in external capital markets. Similar evidence is also found in China (Desai et al. 2004) . Analysis using detailed customs data from China, has shown that foreignowned affiliates and joint ventures have better export performance than private domestic firms, and that this advantage is systematically greater in sectors at higher levels of financial vulnerability (Manova et al. 2011) . The effect of FIE on ODI could also, however, proxy for foreign market experience, which does not necessary reflect the financial constraint considerations. To address this concern, the export experience is controlled in the model specification of this analysis.
Productivity is measured as the output per worker, after controlling for capital intensity. There are two reasons for the adoption of labour productivity rather than TFP (based on Olley and Pakes 1996) as a productivity measure. First, labour productivity is the most widely used way to measure productivity in literature (for example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) , making our results comparable to existing studies. And second, accounting data does not necessarily correspond well to the underlying economic variables in theoretical production functions (Head and Ries 2003) , and the principle shortcoming of productivity estimates cannot be greatly reduced by more complex econometric methods that appear to make strong identifying assumptions (Syverson 2004 ). Higher Financial Constraint, Lower Propensity of Investing Abroad?
We employ a multiple choice logit model to dissect how financial constraints impact three decisions on foreign market entry: ODI (may or may not export), purely export, and domestic oriented. In addition to financial constraints, we also control other variables that might play a role in a firms' decision, including productivity, size, inventory ratio, firm age, profitability and capital intensity, as well as year dummy to capture cyclical effects and industry dummy to capture industry-specific effects.
Accordingly, we obtain the following multinomial logit model for estimation:
(1) j is the nature of the firm, which is either ODI firms (F), exporters (E), or domestic firms (D).Yd is year dummy, and Id is industry dummy. The description for other variables and their mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum is shown in Table 16 .2. Table 16 .3 provides the results for estimating equation (1) for the full sample. For both measures, financial constraint plays a significant and influential role in Chinese firms' export and ODI decision. Firms with less financial constraint (more liquidity, or with foreign ownership) are more likely to enter foreign markets, pursuing ODI. This finding suggests that financial constraints reduce the probability that a firm will engage in export and ODI, as this it is difficult to finance the initial costs of entry into a foreign market. Todo (2011) also finds such a negative effect in Japan, but there it is not significant. It can be implied that the financing constraint is a more serious and repressive factor in China than in Japan.
Basic Results
Besides this, firms with higher productivity are more likely to conduct ODI and export. This is consistent with Melitz (2003) and HMY (2004) . In addition to productivity, firm size also positively affects the probability of engaging in both export and ODI. And the magnitude of such positive influence is much larger by firm size than by productivity. For instance, firm size compared with productivity has roughly three times larger positive effects on firms' probability of ODI. That the impact of productivity is smaller in magnitude has been found by other analysts (Bernard et al. 2003; Greenaway and Kneller 2004) . The coefficient of profitability is also negative and generally significant. For Chinese firms it means that the higher their profitability, the lower the probability that they will enter foreign markets. This behaviour may be partly because of the higher risk involved in internationalisation. When firms earn a reasonable profit at home, they may be reluctant to take such risk. This behaviour also reflects why some Chinese firms lack a global perspective. 
Mitigating Effects of Productivity?
This section considers if there are mitigating effects of productivity on financial constraint. That is, if higher productivity could to some extent compensate for financial constraints when firms make foreign market entry decisions. The following equation therefore includes the interaction terms of financial constraint and productivity in the multinomial logit model (2):
(2) (2) Year-specific fixed effects and Industry-specific fixed effects are controlled.
Source: Authors' own estimations.
As seen in Table 16 .4, the mitigating effects of productivity indeed exist in export decisions, but are not generally valid for ODI decisions. After controlling for financial constraints and productivity, there is still a significantly negative impact of their interaction terms on export decision. The results of interaction terms on ODI decisions are mixed, however: liquidity measure for financial constraint does not have a significant impact, while the FIE measure predicts a significantly negative sign. It suggests that higher productivity can mitigate some of the negative impact of financial constraint for exporters. But financial constraint is so serious for ODI firms that higher productivity could not compensate for its presence.
Dealing with Potential Endogeneity
One challenge for studies that try to establish a causal effect of financial constraint on firms' foreign market entry decisions is that the measures of financial constraints may be endogenous. For example, a 2007 study found that the financial health of UK firms improves after they begin exporting, despite the fact that at the time of entry into the export market, future exporters do not demonstrate as financially healthier than firms focusing only the domestic market (Greenaway et al. 2007 ).
To deal with potential endogeneity in the specification here, one-period lag variable for financial constraint is included in the multinomial logit regression. Here, FIE variable is time-invariant. In addition to the fact of financial constraint, it could also proxy for the foreign market experience. The export share is, therefore, incorporated with one-period lag in the robustness check to control for the possible foreign market experience. Results are reported in Table 16 .5. As seen, after including the liquidity variable with one-period lag and control export share variable with one-period lag, financial constraint is still negatively impacting the ODI decision, as well as the export decision. Firms with less financial constraint (more liquidity, or with foreign ownership) are more likely to enter foreign markets, pursuing ODI. Also, productivity and size have a significantly positive effect, while profitability is a negatively influential factor. To deal with potential endogeneity in this specification, the sample is reduced to firms pursuing ODI for the first time in the period 2006-2008. The results of re-estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 16 .6. As reported, even for firms pursing ODI for the first time, financial constraint is still a significant negative factor that firms with less financial constraint are more likely to conduct ODI. Still, productivity and size play a contributing role in foreign market entry, while profitability is negatively related with the probability of ODI and exports. (2) Year-specific fixed effects and Industry-specific fixed effects are controlled.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides firm-level evidence on the harmful consequences of financial constraint on firms' capability to pursue ODI. It shows that financial constraint severely restricts the probability of a firm entering the ODI market. This finding is robust after controlling for possible endogeneity.
Consistent with existing literature, this chapter also finds firm productivity plays a significant contributing role in a firm's ODI activities, in the decision to engage in ODI, and how much to invest. But it is clear that such contributing role does not mitigate the negative impact of financial constraint for ODI, albeit it could relieve some financial constraint for exporters. That is, even if a firm improves its productivity significantly, if the financial crunch remains, the firm may be unable to pursue ODI.
This chapter has strong policy implications. Financial constraint for SMEs is a worldwide problem, but it is even more serious in China, which is characterised by financial repression and controlled capital account. The Chinese Government has attached great importance to outward direct investment and also provides a fiscal subsidy for ODI players. But this cannot compensate for the financial constraint Chinese private SMEs face when they decide whether or not pursue ODI, and how much to invest. As a result, the more viable, more productive and more competitive enterprises are likely to be shut out, which is detrimental to capital efficiency and the transformation of growth mode.
